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Freedom of Expression and the  
Law of the Democratic Process 
Colin Feasby* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Harper v. Canada is the third and (probably) final chapter in a 20-
year struggle between the National Citizens’ Coalition and the federal 
government over election laws.
1
 The contest was ostensibly about the 
regulation of election expenditures made by third parties — individuals 
and organizations who are neither candidates nor political parties. Third 
party expenditure limits, though important to those affected, are at the 
margins of the campaign finance regime. The fact that the struggle over 
third party expenditure limits has enjoyed relative prominence compared 
to other challenges and potential challenges to the constitutionality of 
the federal campaign finance regime is curious.
2
 Like the proxy wars 
between the United States and the U.S.S.R., however, Harper and earli-
er third party spending cases were really about a larger ideological ques-
tion; namely, whether an egalitarian or libertarian model of election 
regulation would prevail in Canada. Harper answered the question de-
finitively — Canada’s philosophy of election regulation is first and 
foremost egalitarian. 
This paper is not a critique of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egali-
tarian model of elections. The precepts of the Court’s egalitarian model 
                                                                                                                                
*
  Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP (Calgary).  I thank Mike Dorf, Rick Hasen, Sam 
Issacharoff, and Greg Tardi for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper.  
Responsibility for all errors and omissions is, of course, my own. 
1
  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [here-
inafter “Harper (SCC)”]. 
2
  The focus of the debate over election regulation in Canada on third party expenditures is 
especially curious given relatively low levels of third party activity in most Canadian elections and 
the existence of other contestable regulations that pertain to candidates and political parties. For a 
discussion of other election regulations that may contravene the Charter, see C. Feasby, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Political Theory and the Constitutionality of the Political Finance 
Regime” in K.D. Ewing & S. Issacharoff, Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International 
Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2005) (forthcoming). 
238  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
will be reviewed, but not contested. Instead, it will be asked whether the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of the egalitarian model led it in Harper 
to be insufficiently rigorous in its scrutiny of third party expenditure 
limits. Previously I have argued that one of the central assumptions of 
the egalitarian model is that limits on political expression are inherent in 
the electoral context. This is what I call the “paradox of political expres-
sion.” The shortcoming of my earlier work is that once the big picture 
case for deference in the electoral context was made, the question of the 
exercise of that deference was underdeveloped.
3
 Both of my previous 
papers made the case for deference to Parliament’s choice of democratic 
values, but concluded that the specific third party limits enacted by the 
Canada Elections Act were nevertheless unconstitutional. What this 
paper attempts to develop is an explanation for how the Court can cir-
cumscribe the application of the egalitarian model by defining the 
boundaries of the electoral context and can exercise a principled defer-
ence and more rigorous judicial review within those boundaries in a way 
that is consistent with the egalitarian model. 
The focus of the following discussion concerns two main aspects of 
the Court’s approach to the judicial review of democratic process ques-
tions. First is the question of the breadth of the egalitarian model as a 
justification for limiting political expression. In doctrinal terms, this 
question is played out under the rubrics of vagueness and overbreadth. 
The third party expenditure limits considered in Harper arguably ex-
tended to all political expression within an election campaign period 
including so-called issue advocacy. Issue advocacy comes in two forms: 
(1) “sham issue advocacy” which is really advocacy for or against a 
particular candidate or political party; and (2) “pure issue advocacy” 
which is expression concerning an issue of public policy with no refer-
ence, veiled or otherwise, to a candidate or political party.
 4
 The Harper 
trial court found that the third party limits were impermissibly vague or 
overbroad or both because they applied to expression concerning issues 
                                                                                                                                
3
  C. Feasby, “Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) and the Administration of the Process of Democ-
racy Under the Charter: The Emerging Egalitarian Model” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 5 [hereinafter 
“The Emerging Egalitarian Model”]; and C. Feasby, “Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in the 
United Kingdom and Canada” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 11. 
4
  See R. Briffault, “Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line” (1999) 77 
Tex. L. Rev. 1751; R. Hasen, “The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy” (2000) 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 265. 
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“associated with political parties or candidates.”5 Essentially, the trial 
court found that expression concerning issues associated with candi-
dates and political parties could be political without necessarily being 
electoral in nature. In other words, the regulation of third party expendi-
tures captures pure issue advocacy. The Supreme Court nevertheless 
found that the overarching legislative objective — fair elections — 
justified the broadly framed spending limits. The majority of the Court’s 
conclusion that the third party spending limits were neither vague nor 
overbroad betrays a lack of understanding of electoral context and the 
problems that face actual participants in the electoral process. Moreover, 
the Court’s failure to take the definitional question seriously indicates 
that the egalitarian principles that justify the regulation of electoral 
expression may be stretched beyond the electoral context. 
Second, the Court’s deferential approach to judicial review in Har-
per is inconsistent with an appreciation for the rough and tumble of the 
electoral context. After concluding that third party spending limits are 
consistent with the egalitarian model and, therefore, pressing and sub-
stantial, the majority in Harper deferred to Parliament’s assessment of 
the appropriate level for the third party spending limits. The minority 
decision is less deferential, but its difference with the majority is under-
developed. The thrust of the argument against the reflexive deference 
exhibited in Harper is that when participation in the democratic process 
is limited in a way that protects the status quo in some fashion, stricter 
scrutiny is necessary. The inspiration for this argument is the revival of 
process theory as a basis for judicial review in the emerging academic 
discipline of law and the democratic process in the United States and 
elsewhere.
6
 A main premise common to most process theories is that 
politicians have an interest in shaping electoral rules to protect the status 
quo or even enhance their position vis à vis their competition. Substan-
tive and dialogue theories have rightly prevailed over process theories as 
the orthodoxy in Canadian academic and judicial circles as general 
accounts of judicial review.
7
 The swing of the pendulum to substantive 
                                                                                                                                
5
  Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] A.J. No. 808, 295 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) [herein-
after “Harper (Q.B.)”]. 
6
  S. Issacharoff & R. Pildes, “Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 643; R. Pildes, “The Theory of Political Competition” (1999) 85 
Va. L. Rev. 1605. 
7
  For a discussion of the fate of process theory in Canada, see: K. Roach, “American Con-
stitutional Theory for Canadians (And the Rest of the World)” (2002) 52 U.T.L.J. 503. On dialogue 
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and dialogue theories of judicial review, however, has impoverished the 
Court’s approach to cases concerning the democratic process. Process 
theories, such as that famously espoused by the late John Hart Ely, have 
important insights to offer that might provide a corrective to the overly 
deferential approach of the Court in Harper.
8
 The limited role for pro-
cess theory that is proposed in this paper has Canadian precedents. In-
deed, it will be suggested that this approach is consistent with some of 
the Supreme Court’s recent democratic process cases and was foreshad-




The second part of the paper takes a step back from the main argu-
ments to be advanced and introduces a field of study that is largely ne-
glected in the Canadian legal academy: “Law and the Democratic 
Process.” This emerging sub-discipline of constitutional law provides 
many of the concepts and much of the context that is missing from Har-
per. Indeed, the appropriateness of an election-specific approach to free 
speech and the relative merits of process theory and more robust theo-
ries of judicial review in democratic process cases are two of the many 
debates that have animated law and the democratic process scholarship 
in recent years. Identifying the lack of Canadian academic debate in this 
area is of particular importance given that Canadian courts appear to be 
increasingly confronting democratic process problems. The third part of 
this paper reviews the lower court and Supreme Court of Canada deci-
sions in Harper. The analysis of the definitional question that relates to 
the question of issue advocacy and the Court’s justification for its defer-
ential approach are highlighted. The fourth part of this paper situates 
Harper within the larger context of the debate over issue advocacy. The 
regulation of pure issue advocacy, it is argued, is not supported by the 
egalitarian model. The concern for defining the electoral realm dis-
cussed in part four in the context of issue advocacy is an important 
complement to the approach to judicial review outlined in the fifth part 
                                                                                                                                
theory, see P. Hogg & A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or 
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75 
and K. Roach, The Supreme Court Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2001). 
8
  J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1980). 
9
  P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell 1987). 
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of this paper. The fifth part of this paper questions the Court’s deferen-
tial stance and suggests that the egalitarian model of elections does not 
require deference in all circumstances. A principled approach to defer-
ence that draws upon aspects of process theory is proposed. 
II. LAW AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
From an international perspective, Canada is at the leading edge of 
many of the developments in constitutional law. Canadian courts and 
legal scholars are pioneers in equality rights, the rights of Aboriginal 
peoples, and many other areas of constitutional law. One area of consti-
tutional law that has suffered comparative neglect is the intersection 
between the Charter and the democratic process. Before the publication 
of Gregory Tardi’s two-volume work titled The Law of Democratic 
Governing in late 2004, with a few salient exceptions, Canadian legal 
scholarship in the last 20 years is barren of any sustained or serious 
consideration of the legal regulation of the democratic process and relat-
ed constitutional issues.
10
 Interestingly, some of the most significant 
contributions to the Canadian literature on law and the democratic pro-
cess are from sources outside the legal academy such as student arti-
cles,
11
 books by members of the practising bar,
12
 efforts of foreign 
scholars,
13
 and political scientists.
14
 Canadian political scientists, in 
                                                                                                                                
10
  G. Tardi, The Law of Democratic Governing (Toronto: Carswell, 2004). The most obvi-
ous exception to this generalization is J. Patrick Boyer’s reference work, Election Law in Canada: 
The Law and Procedure of Federal, Provincial and Territorial Elections (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1987). Boyer’s Election Law and his other publications are principally descriptive and do not 
contemplate the impact of the Charter in depth. 
11
  See, e.g.: N. Devlin, “Opinion Polls and the Protection of Political Speech — A Com-
ment on Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)” (1996-1997) Ottawa L. Rev. 
412; C. Feasby, “Egalitarian Model” supra, note 3; C. Feasby, “Public Opinion Poll Restrictions, 
Elections, and the Charter” (1997) 55 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 241; T. Knight, “Unconstitutional Democ-
racy? A Charter Challenge to Canada’s Electoral System” (1999) 57 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1;  
T. Knight, “Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada” (2001) 46 McGill L.J. 1063; J. 
LaCalamita, “The Equitable Campaign: Party Political Broadcasting Regulation in Canada” (1984) 
22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 543. 
12
  See, e.g.: Tardi, The Law of Democratic Governing, supra, note 10; and Boyer, Election 
Law in Canada, supra, note 10. 
13
  See, e.g.: A.C. Geddis, “Liberté, Egalité, Argent: Third Party Election Spending and the 
Charter” (2004) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 429; A.C. Geddis, “Democratic Visions and Third-Party Inde-
pendent Expenditures: A Comparative View” (2001) 9 Tul. L. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 5; K.D. Ewing, 
Money, Politics, and Law: A Study of Campaign Finance Reform in Canada (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992). 
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particular, deserve credit for exploring the intersection of law and the 
democratic process from the perspective of their academic discipline. 
Canadian law faculties, however, have accomplished little in this area.
15
 
This is not surprising because there is not a single tenured or tenure 
track professor in Canada who identifies law and the democratic process 
as a primary or even secondary research interest. The lack of interest in 
law and the democratic process is also reflected in many faculty-taught 
entry level constitutional law courses where the study of democratic 
rights and freedom of expression cases that implicate the democratic 
process occupy a subordinate position to subjects that are more fashion-
able in the Canadian legal academy. Despite the barren landscape de-
scribed, there are signs that this tradition of neglect is waning. During 
                                                                                                                                
14
  On the constitutionality of campaign finance laws, e.g., various articles by J. Hiebert in-
cluding, “Money and Elections: Can Citizens Participate on Fair Terms Amidst Unrestricted 
Spending?” (1998) 31:1 Canadian Journal of Political Science 91; various articles by H. Bakvis & 
J. Smith including, “Third-Party Advertising and Electoral Democracy: The Political Theory of the 
Alberta Court of Appeal in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney General)” (1997) 23:2 Can. Pub. Pol’y 
164; L. Young, “Regulating Campaign Finance in Canada: Strengths and Weaknesses” (2004) 3 
Elect. L.J. 444. On redistricting and the question of one person, one vote see John C. Courtney’s 
many articles and books including, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). On the constitutional rights of 
small political parties, for example: H. MacIvor, The Charter of Rights and Party Politics: The 
Impact of the Supreme Court of Canada Ruling in Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004) 
10 Choices (Montreal: IRPP) and H. MacIvor, “Judicial Review and Electoral Democracy: The 
Contested Status of Political Parties Under the Charter” (2002) 21 Windsor Y.B. Access to Just. 
479. Generally on judicial review and the democratic process, see: J. Smith & H. Bakvis, “Judicial 
Review and Electoral Law” in M. Westmacott & H. Mellon, eds., Political Dispute and Judicial 
Review: Assessing the Work of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Nelson, 2000), at 64;  
H. MacIvor, Canadian Politics and Government in the Charter Era (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 
2006) (forthcoming); R. Knopff, “How Democratic is the Charter? And Does it Matter?” (2003) 19 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 199. 
15
  One notable exception is a symposium held jointly by the University of Saskatchewan 
College of Law and Department of Political Science in 1992 to discuss Reference re Provincial 
Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. See J.C. Courtney,  
P. MacKinnon, & D.E. Smith, Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts, and Electoral Values 
(Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1992) featuring contributions or commentaries from law 
professors R. Fritz, K. Roach, and K. Swinton. Participants in that symposium have also dealt with 
the question of redistricting in other articles, see: R. Fritz, “The 1990s Federal Electoral Boundaries 
Readjustments and the Charter” (1998) 61 Sask. L. Rev. 467; R. Fritz, “Challenging Electoral 
Boundaries Under the Charter: Judicial Deference and Burden of Proof” (1999) 5 Rev. Const. Stud. 
1; K. Roach, “Reapportionment in British Columbia” (1990) 24 U.B.C. L. Rev. 79. Other law 
review articles written by Canadian law professors over the last 20 years include: B. Schwartz, 
“Proportional Representation for Canada?” (2001) 28 Man. L.J. 133; R. Haigh, “Between Here and 
There Is Better Than Anything Over There: The Morass of Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral 
Officer)” (2003) 20 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 353; J. Cameron, “Governance and Anarchy in the s. 2(b) 
Jurisprudence: A Comment on Re Vancouver Sun and Harper v. Canada” (2005) 17 N.J.C.L. 71. 
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the past year, three Canadian law schools, two for the first time, offered 
upper year courses that featured the democratic process as the central 
focus or as a major topic.
16
 However, it is significant that all three 
courses were taught by non-faculty members. 
The dearth of attention to the democratic process among Canadian 
legal scholars may be attributable to the relative inattention of the 
Supreme Court of Canada to the same subject. While the Supreme 
Court of Canada has considered many political questions since the 
advent of the Charter, it considered surprisingly few cases concerning 
the democratic process during the first 15 years of the Charter.
17
 More 
                                                                                                                                
16
  University of Alberta, Law 599: “Law and the Democratic Process” (Fall, 2004) (In-
structor: Colin Feasby). University of Ottawa, CML 4104E: “Studies in Public Law: The Law of 
Canadian Democracy” (Winter, 2005) (Instructor: Aaron Freeman). Note that the University of 
Ottawa course concerns a number of the practical aspects of the practice of politics such as lobbyist 
regulation and the role of the ethics counsellor that are not necessarily constitutional in nature. 
McGill University, CMPL 518: “Policies, Politics, and the Legislative Process” (Instructor: Grego-
ry Tardi). The McGill University course concerns “political law” which Greg Tardi defines as 
broadly to include all of the practices and procedures of Parliament as well as those subjects that 
are said to comprise law and the democratic process in this paper. The Alberta, Ottawa, and McGill 
courses should be distinguished from those such as Michael Mandel’s “Legal Politics” course at 
Osgoode Hall which concerns how law deals with “political issues” rather than the “political 
process” although the two are intertwined to some extent. Kent Roach’s course “The Role of Courts 
in a Democracy” at the University of Toronto also touches on some democratic process issues, but 
is concerned more with the broader question of the legitimacy of courts and judicial review in a 
democratic society. 
17
  Notable exceptions to this generalization are Reference re Provincial Electoral Bounda-
ries (Sask.), supra, note 15; Haig v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 
S.C.R. 995; and Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 82, [1996] 2 
S.C.R. 876. The Supreme Court has denied leave on the following cases which appear to meet the 
criteria of “public importance” and uncertainty in the law: Re Allman v. Northwest Territories 
(Commissioner), [1984] 1 S.C.R. v (challenging residency requirements for voting in a referen-
dum); Campbell v. Canada, [1988] 6 W.W.R. lxviii (concerning allocation of seats in the House of 
Commons among the provinces and with a strong dissent at the British Columbia Court of Appeal); 
Pacific Press v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 628 (striking down B.C. 
Elections Act third party election expense restrictions contrary to Libman and striking down manda-
tory disclosure of polling data contrary to obiter in Thomson Newspapers, [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877; Charlottetown (City) v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 64 
(interpreting Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries as setting out a +/- 25 per cent rule contrary to the 
interpretation of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Reference re: Electoral Division Statutes Amend-
ment Act, 1993, [1994] A.J. No. 768 (C.A.)); and Fitzgerald (Next friend of) v. Alberta, [2004] 
S.C.C.A. No. 349 (challenging age restrictions on the right to vote). The following cases were 
either not appealed to the Supreme Court or leave applications were discontinued: Lac la Biche 
(Town) v. Alberta, [1994] S.C.C.A. No. 500 (concerning principles other than population applicable 
to redistricting); Barrette v. Canada, [1994] Q.J. No. 219, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 623 (C.A.) (challenging 
the threshold for reimbursement of election expenditures in federal elections); Reference re: 
Electoral Division Statutes Amendment Act, 1993, [1994] A.J. No. 768 (C.A.) (concerning burden 
of justifying population deviations); Reform Party of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 
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recent cases suggest that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to tackle 
democratic process cases in the early Charter era may be receding. 
Beginning with Libman
18
 in 1997 and continuing with the Secession 
Reference
19
 and Thomson Newspapers
20
 in 1998, Corbière
21
 in 1999, 
Figueroa
22
 in 2002, Sauvé
23
 in 2003, and now Harper in 2004 the 
Supreme Court is showing an increasing propensity for wading into 
the political thicket.
24
 Moreover, an unscientific survey of case law 
from lower courts over the past year indicates that the democratic 
process is contested in Canadian courts more than ever before.
25
 The 
Supreme Court’s emerging jurisprudence of the democratic process 
and the growth in litigation over the democratic process merit a com-
mensurate increase in scholarly attention. 
                                                                                                                                
A.J. No. 793, 10 W.W.R. 764 (C.A.) (challenging the reservation and allocation of broadcast time 
for political broadcasts and with a strong dissent in the Alberta Court of Appeal); Somerville v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [1996] A.J. No. 515, 184 A.R. 241 (C.A.). 
18
  Libman v. Canada (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569. 
19
  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
20
  Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 877. 
21
  Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203. 
22
  Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912. 
23
  Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
24
  The “political thicket” is the evocative description used by Frankfurter J. to describe 
laws governing the democratic process: Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 at 556 (1946). Justice 
Frankfurter was of the view that the Court should not involve itself in political questions such as the 
apportionment question before the Court in Colgrove. 
25
  Lower court cases concerning the democratic process within the last 12 months include: 
Lukaszuk v. Kibermanis, [2005] A.J. No. 167 (C.A.) (contested election and meaning of voter 
intention); R. v. Bryan, [2004] B.C.J. No. 451 (C.A.) (leave to appeal successful Charter challenge 
of publication ban on election results prior to close of polls in British Columbia); Baier v. Alberta, 
[2004] A.J. No. 1003 (Q.B.) (Charter s. 2(b) challenge to restrictions on school board employees 
standing for election to school board); Fitzgerald v. Alberta, [2004] A.J. No. 570 (C.A.) (Charter  
s. 3 challenge concerning the right of persons under 18 to vote); Danielson v. Calgary City, [2004] 
A.J. No. 1404 (Q.B.) (alleged electoral fraud in municipal election); Barron v. Warkentin, [2004] 
A.J. No. 919 (Q.B.) (jurisdiction of court to interfere with regulation of constituency nomination 
contest); Raîche v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] F.C.J. No. 839 (T.D.) (minority rights in 
redistricting process); Grewal v. Conservative Party of Canada, [2004] O.J. No. 2299 (S.C.) 
(constituency nomination dispute — disqualification of candidate for criminal record); Ahenakew v. 
MacKay, [2004] O.J. No. 2318 (C.A.) (regulation and merger of political parties); Sinclair v. 
Conservative Party of Canada, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1966 (T.D.) (judicial review of Chief Electoral 
Officer’s decision on merger of political parties); Barkley v. Anderson, [2004] A.J. No. 1307 (C.A.) 
(dispute over voter lists in nomination contest); Bellerose v. Patenaude, [2004] A.J. No. 1063 
(Q.B.) (contested election in a Métis Settlement); Monaghan v. Joyce, [2004] N.J. No. 76 (Nfld. 
S.C.T.D.) (application to void an election). 
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The dearth of study of the legal regulation of the democratic process 
in Canada is in stark contrast to developments in other constitutional 
democracies where the study of the role of the courts in policing the 
democratic process is a burgeoning academic industry. The United 
States is at the vanguard of the study of law and the democratic process. 
This is not surprising given the history of prominent U.S. cases concern-
ing the democratic process beginning with the one person, one vote 
cases in the 1960s and extending through Bush v. Gore and the more 
recent battles over the California recall election and the 2004 elections. 
Symposia in leading law reviews on the democratic process are com-
mon,
26
 many major law schools offer at least one upper year course on 
the subject,
27
 there are two commercial case books available,
28
 and re-
cently a specialist legal journal — the Election Law Journal — was 
founded.
29
 The study of law and the democratic process is not an aca-
demic ghetto confined to specialists. Quite the opposite, in fact. Giants 
of the U.S. legal academy including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, 
Owen Fiss, Frank Michelman, Richard Posner, Frederick Schauer, and 
Cass Sunstien have all given democratic process questions serious con-
sideration over the past decade both before and after the seminal event 
of Bush v. Gore.
30
 The growth in the study of law and the democratic 
                                                                                                                                
26
  See, e.g., “Symposium: Regulating the Electoral Process” (1993) 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1409; 
“Law and the Political Process” (1998) 50 Stan. L. Rev. 605; “Symposium: The Law and Econom-
ics of Election Law” (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 1533; “Election Law as its Own Field of Study” (1999) 
32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1095; “Symposium: Law and Political Parties” (2000) 100 Colum. L. Rev. 
593; “Symposium: Baker v. Carr: A Commemorative Symposium” (2002) N.C. L. Rev. 1103; 
“Symposium: Federal Courts and Electoral Politics” (2002) 82 Boston U. L. Rev. 608; “Symposi-
um: The Supreme Court and Election Law” (2004) 31 J. of Legislation 1; “Symposium: Law of 
Democracy” (2004) 153 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1; “Symposium: Democracy and Elections in North 
America: What Can We Learn from Our Neighbor?” (2004) 3 Election L. J. 396. 
27
  Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, NYU, Pennsylvania, Stanford, UCLA, Virginia 
and Yale. For a complete list of law and the democratic process teachers and their respective universi-
ties, see the database posted online at: <www.electionlaw.org> (last accessed 17 June 2005). 
28
  S. Issacharoff, P. Karlan, & R. Pildes, eds., The Law of Democracy, 2d ed. (New York: 
Foundation Press, 2001); D. Lowenstein & R. Hasen, eds., Election Law—Cases and Materials, 3d 
ed. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2004). 
29
  The first issue of the Election Law Journal was released in March 2002. 
30
  See, e.g., B. Ackerman & I. Ayres, Voting With Dollars: A New Paradigm for 
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process is not a phenomenon peculiar to the United States. Two recent 
law review symposia have been dedicated to law and the democratic 
process in Australia.
31
 Moreover, there is a growing international com-
munity of scholars examining developments in law and the democratic 
process from a comparative perspective.
32
 
The profusion of legal writing on the democratic process has given 
rise to a growing recognition in the U.S. and elsewhere that the intersec-
tion of constitutional law and the democratic process is a distinct sub-
discipline of constitutional law with recognizable parameters. In a law 
review symposium dedicated to the subject of “Election Law as its Own 
Field of Study,” Pamela Karlan asked rhetorically: “What then does it 
mean to talk about the legal structure of the political process as its own 
field of study?” According to Karlan: 
The law governing politics is a form of applied constitutional law; it 
involves repeated interactions among statutes and constitutional 
provisions, courts and legislatures, and state and national 
governments. Moreover, looking at the statutes, structures, and cases 
that govern our politics as it is actually conducted may offer a far 
richer avenue for understanding constitutional law generally than 
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The field of study described by Karlan, is both old and new.
34
 Law 
and the democratic process as a field of study comprises much of the 
constitutional law that would have been familiar to Dicey and Bage-
hot.
35
 Indeed, the right to vote, the form of the electoral system, and 
rules applicable to Parliament were central parts of constitutional law as 
it was known prior to the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Charter. The 
field of study is only new in the sense that it marries a Diceyan concept 
of constitutional law — small “c” constitutional law — with contempo-
rary big “C” constitutional law which in Canada is dominated by the 
Charter. Subjects that fall within the ambit of law and the democratic 
process are at least: (1) contested elections and referenda; (2) campaign 
finance (public funding, spending limits, allocation of free broadcasting, 
etc.); (3) redistricting; (4) minority rights in the democratic process;  
(5) limits on participatory rights; (6) the structure of the electoral sys-
tem; (7) non-financial limits on expression during elections and referen-
da; and (8) the role and regulation of candidates, political parties and 
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third parties. Each of these subjects raise both small “c” and big “C” 
constitutional issues. 
Even if the suggestion is accepted that law and the democratic pro-
cess has been neglected by the Canadian legal academy, one might well 
ask: “So what?” The first and foremost reason why law and the demo-
cratic process matters is that for better or worse the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Charter analysis is explicitly contextual.36 Context, in law and 
democratic process cases, concerns the nature of politics and the rela-
tionship between political actors and the legal regime that regulates 
politics. Individual litigants too often overlook context, so sometimes 
the courts look to the legal academy for reflection on the larger implica-
tions of discrete controversies. Law and the democratic process, as the 
discipline has evolved in the United States, has been the crucible for a 
vibrant debate and cross-fertilization between political scientists and 
constitutional lawyers. This debate and cross-fertilization has both 
deepened the legal analysis of democratic process issues and made the 
work of political scientists more accessible to the courts. This is not to 
suggest that U.S. courts have availed themselves of the ample body of 
literature that exists in that country or that their decision-making is any 
better than that of the Supreme Court of Canada; rather, it is to suggest 
that if a robust Canadian law and the democratic process literature exist-
ed, it could assist the Court to appreciate the context of the democratic 
process. As will be explained later in this paper, the Court’s lack of 
appreciation for context is one of the shortcomings of the Harper deci-
sion. One cannot help but wonder if the absence of a vibrant Canadian 
literature on law and the democratic process is partially responsible for 
the Supreme Court’s impoverished understanding of context. 
Quite apart from understanding the practice of politics in context, 
the law and democratic process scholarship has confronted anew de-
bates over the relationship between legislatures and the courts and the 
nature of judicial review. It is no accident that democratic process issues 
have attracted the attention of many of the leading U.S. legal theorists in 
recent years. This development is particularly apposite given that the 
Supreme Court of Canada in its recent democratic process cases has 
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  For a criticism of the Supreme Court’s contextual approach see generally, J. Cameron, 
“The Past, Present, and Future of Expressive Freedom Under the Charter” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall 
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both unabashedly stepped into the realm of political theory and strug-
gled with developing a principled approach to judicial review. Perhaps 
the most obvious failure of the Court is that it has not developed a prin-
cipled approach to judicial review in democratic process cases. As this 
paper will endeavour to explain later, the U.S. debate between an explic-
itly normative approach and a more structural or process-oriented ap-
proach to democratic process cases is relevant to the predicament in 
which the Supreme Court of Canada finds itself after Harper. Indeed, it 
will be suggested that heightened sensitivity to process questions in both 
section 2(b) and section 3 cases may bring much needed coherence to 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the democratic process. 
III. HARPER V. CANADA 
1.  Canada Elections Act 2000 — Third Party Election Spending 
Limits 
Third party spending limits have been a central feature of the Cana-
dian political finance regime since it was first conceived. The main 
pillars of Canada’s political finance legislation, including third party 
spending limits, were originally suggested in Canada by the Barbeau 
Committee in 1966 and enacted in 1974.
37
 The 1974 third party spend-
ing limits prohibited any expenditures during a campaign period that 
directly promoted or opposed a candidate or political party, but provided 
for a “good faith” exception. The good faith exception provided essen-
tially that a third party that incurred expenses with respect to the promo-
tion of an issue of public policy was protected so long as there was no 
co-ordination or collusion with a candidate or political party. The good 
faith exception was tested in a 1978 case where a union member hired a 
plane to fly around the city of Ottawa towing a banner that said “O.H.C. 
Employees 767 C.U.P.E. vote, but not Liberal.”38 The failure to secure a 
conviction showed that the third party spending limits were toothless. 
Parliament responded in 1983 by removing the good faith exception.
39
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38
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The prohibition on third party spending minus the good faith exception 
was challenged by the National Citizen’s Coalition in one of the first 
Charter section 2(b) cases.
40
 The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench struck 
down the third party spending limits as an unjustifiable limit on freedom 
of expression shortly before the 1984 federal election. The decision was 
not appealed and no third party spending limits were enforced in either 
the 1984 or 1988 elections. 
The 1988 election was marked by significant third party spending 
by proponents and opponents of the Free Trade Agreement between 
Canada and the United States.
41
 In response to public concerns over the 
political process and political finance, following the 1988 election the 
Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing chaired by 
Pierre Lortie was appointed. The Lortie Commission recommended in 
1992 that third party spending limits be reinstituted and that the limits 
apply to indirect as well as direct promotion or opposition of candidates 
or political parties.
42
 The following year Parliament amended the Cana-
da Elections Act to provide for a $1,000 spending limit for third parties 
but did not broaden the limit to indirect promotion or opposition of 
candidates or political parties.
43
 Shortly after the amendments, the Na-
tional Citizens’ Coalition once again challenged the constitutionality of 
third party spending limits. In 1996, the Alberta Court of Appeal struck 
down the third party spending limits in Somerville v. Canada (Attorney 
General) on the basis that the legislative objective was not pressing and 
substantial.
44
 As a result of Somerville, the third party spending limits 
were not enforced during the 1997 election. 
The 1997 Supreme Court decision in Libman was a turning point. 
The Court accepted that the purpose of political finance controls was 
egalitarian and found the legislative objective behind the specific third 
party spending limits in issue to be pressing and substantial. The Court 
in Libman, however, went further to explicitly disagree with the Alberta 
Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Somerville describing the purpose of the 
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Canada Elections Act’s political finance regime as “laudable.”45 Despite 
finding the purpose of the legislation to be praiseworthy, the Court 
struck down the specific limits in Quebec’s Referendum Act on the 
grounds that they were not minimally impairing. 
Following Libman, Parliament was emboldened to once again enact 
third party spending limits. The CEA 2000 provided for two limits: a 
$150,000 aggregate national limit and a $3,000 constituency limit. The 
$150,000 national limit pertained to “election advertising,” defined as 
communications that promote or oppose a particular candidate or party, 
including communications that take “a position on an issue with which a 
registered party or candidate is associated.”46 Parliament in the CEA 
2000 essentially adopted the Lortie Commission’s recommendation to 
regulate third party activities that indirectly promote candidates and 
political parties. The definition of “election advertising,” unlike the 
definitions that preceded it, does not require that communications that 
promote or oppose a political party or candidate be direct. The $3,000 
constituency limit applies to communications that promote or oppose 
candidates by: “(a) naming them; (b) showing their likeness; (c) identi-
fying them by their respective political affiliations; or (d) taking a posi-
tion on an issue with which they are particularly associated.”47 
2.  The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
Shortly after the adoption of the CEA 2000, Stephen Harper, erst-
while president of the National Citizens’ Coalition and present leader of 
the Conservative Party of Canada, commenced an action under section 
2(b) and section 3 of the Charter to declare the new third party spending 
limits and certain related provisions unconstitutional.
48
 After the trial, 
but before a decision was rendered, a federal election was called. Harper 
successfully moved before the trial judge for an injunction suspending 
operation of the law.
49
 The injunction order was upheld by the Court of 
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Appeal, but reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada approximately 
halfway through the election campaign.
50
 
The trial decision in Harper was released following the 2000 elec-
tion. Justice Cairns did not find that the third party spending limits 
violated section 3. Justice Cairns held, without the benefit of the Su-
preme Court’s more expansive views in Figueroa, that section 3 is prin-
cipally concerned with representation, not information. The 
informational component of the right to vote is ancillary to the right to 
effective representation and accordingly guarantees the voter only “suf-
ficient information.”51 Justice Cairns’ reasons make it clear that he 
viewed third party spending limits as a freedom of expression problem, 
not a democratic rights issue. 
Justice Cairns held that the third party spending limits violated sec-
tion 2(b) and was not saved under section 1. In arriving at this conclu-
sion, Cairns J. distinguished the case from Libman. Justice Cairns’ way 
around Libman was to find that the basis for the Lortie Commission’s 
recommendations, upon which the Supreme Court in Libman had relied, 
was a discredited research study.
52
 This same conclusion, together with 
the government’s inability to provide other empirical evidence of harm 
caused by third party advertising, led Cairns J. to conclude that the ex-
penditure limits did not serve a pressing and substantial objective and 
were therefore unconstitutional. 
For the purposes of this paper, the most important part of Cairns J.’s 
decision is his approach to two other aspects of section 1 of the Charter; 
namely, his consideration of the definition of the word “associated” in 
the context of the section 1 requirement that limits be “prescribed by 
law” and in the context of his minimal impairment analysis and his 
evaluation of the monetary limit chosen by Parliament in his minimal 
impairment analysis. Justice Cairns found that the regulation of expres-
sion concerning issues “associated” with parties and candidates was 
unconstitutionally vague and did not constitute a limit “prescribed by 
law.” Justice Cairns added rhetorically: 
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 Is a person being given fair notice of the conduct which is being 
proscribed? With respect to the matter of issues which are “associated” 
with a party or candidate, I find there is not fair notice. While one or 
two issues may stand out in every election, parties and candidates 
generally take a position on a host of issues. All of the major parties 
will have positions on issues ranging from health care to constitutional 
reform. A third party could take a position on an issue considering it to 
be pure issue advertising, only to subsequently find out that Elections 
Canada considers the issues to be “associated” or even “particularly 
associated” with a party or candidate … thus running afoul of the 
legislation. It is ill-defined.
53
 
Put differently, Cairns J. is concerned about the definition extending 
beyond the underlying legislative objective. 
Justice Cairns did not come to a conclusion concerning the appro-
priateness of the quantum of the spending limits. He explained that he 
was “not in a position to determine what the appropriate numbers are 
and some deference should be accorded to Parliament.”54 At the same 
time, however, he noted that he was “troubled by the relatively low 
numbers and the relatively limited amount of speech that can be en-
gaged in by third parties within the limits.”55 Justice Cairns in any event 
concluded that the spending limits were not minimally impairing for the 
same reasons that he concluded that the limits were vague. 
3.  The Alberta Court of Appeal 
(a)  The Majority Decision of Paperny J.A. 
Justice Paperny, writing for the majority of the Alberta Court of 
Appeal, concurred with the trial judge that third party spending limits 
did not offend section 3 of the Charter but that third party spending 
limits violated section 2(b). The majority also agreed with the trial 
judge’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of harm arising 
from third party electoral activities to support a finding that the legisla-
tive objective was pressing and substantial.
56
 Despite her conclusion, 
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she undertook a full section 1 analysis. She approached her section 1 
analysis on the basis that if she was incorrect with respect to her conclu-
sion on the lack of a pressing and substantial objective, the lack of proof 
of harm was nevertheless relevant to the standard of review to be ap-
plied. Indeed, she concluded that: 
 This is not a case where great deference is to be accorded to 
Parliament’s objectives. As in Thomson Newspapers, when the 
contextual factors indicate that the government has not established the 
harm to be prevented is widespread or significant or when the group to 
be protected is not historically vulnerable or disadvantaged, little 
deference should be shown.
57
 
Justice Paperny’s strict standard of review is most evident in her consid-
eration of whether or not the third party spending limits were minimally 
impairing. 
On the section 1 threshold question of vagueness, Paperny J.A. dis-
agreed with Cairns J. as to whether the limit was “prescribed by law.” 
Despite conceding the fact that “‘association’ cannot be defined a priori 
with precision,” Paperny J.A. concluded that “it is possible to determine 
when third party messages bear sufficient resemblance to political party 
and candidate policies that they come under the administration of the 
Elections Act 2000.”58 Justice Paperny, following the usual practice of 
Canadian courts, preferred to consider the definitional question as part 
of her minimal impairment analysis.
59
 
Justice Paperny’s minimal impairment analysis focused on two sep-
arate problems. First, she considered the quantum of the third party 
limits. To Paperny J.A., it was clear that in many cases the electoral 
district limit of $3,000 “renders even minimally effective third party 
advertising nugatory. A scheme that so restricts freedom of expression 
to make it ineffectual is equivalent to an absolute ban.”60 She also con-
cluded that: 
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the $150,000 overall limit, even if perfectly apportioned at $3,000 
among districts, only allows spending in 50 constituencies.… Or by 
another calculation, $150,000 divided among 298 constituencies 
provides for little over $503 per constituency. The total limit appears 
to amount to a ban on nationwide advertising.
61
  
Foreshadowing the language used in Figueroa, Paperny J.A. concluded 
that such stringent limits were unjustifiable because it precluded citizens 
from “meaningful expression.”62 
Justice Paperny’s conclusion that the spending limits were too mi-
serly is unremarkable. What is much more interesting is that she identi-
fied the problem of limiting issue advocacy: 
The Elections Act 2000 [third party spending limits] include those who 
simply want to raise the profile of an issue regardless of political 
affiliations. By including such expressions in the legislation, the 
infringement of rights goes beyond what is necessary to control 
election financing by encroaching upon the freedom of expression of 
those who seek to voice public concerns which are inconsequential to 




Even more clearly than Cairns J., Paperny J.A. appreciates that the stat-
ed underlying legislative objective does not extend to non-partisan ex-
pression concerning issues during an election period. Essentially what 
Paperny J.A. concluded was that even if there was a pressing and sub-
stantial objective, it did not justify the regulation of third party pure 
issue advocacy. As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court in Har-
per entirely missed this point. 
(b)  The Dissenting Decision of Berger J.A. 
Justice Berger’s dissenting reasons begin with a discussion of the 
dialogue theory of judicial review. Dialogue theory has particular reso-
nance in the context of third party spending limits because of the give 
and take between the courts and Parliament over third party spending 
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limits in the CEA and between the courts and provincial legislatures 
with respect to similar legislation. Justice Berger was careful to note that 
the Supreme Court in Sauvé pointed out that “the dialogue metaphor 
does not signal a lowering of the s. 1 justification standard.”64 At the 
same time, however, he framed the question before the Court in Harper 
to be “whether the response of the Parliament of Canada in enacting the 
Canada Elections Act 2000 is properly respectful of the Charter values 
identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Libman v. Quebec (Attor-
ney General).”65 Dialogue in this case may not have led directly to Ber-
ger J.A. adopting a deferential stance in principle; however, indirectly 
the idea that inquiry was limited to whether the legislative response was 
consistent with Libman suggests a lower standard of review in practice. 
Justice Berger confronted the definitional issue in the context of the 
threshold question of whether the third party spending limits were “pre-
scribed by law” rather than in his minimal impairment analysis. Justice 
Berger, unlike the trial judge, Paperny J.A., or the Supreme Court, of-
fered a suggestion as to how a court might deal with the indeterminacy 
of the word “associated” if actually confronted with an alleged violation 
of the third party spending limts. Justice Berger suggested that “[t]he 
relevant inquiry … will be whether a reasonable person would perceive 
that third party election advertising takes a position on an issue that is 
particularly associated with a registered political party or candidate.”66 
The addition of a reasonableness qualification goes some way to resolv-
ing the vagueness of the word “associated,” but it does not necessarily 
reduce the breadth of the definition. Justice Berger, however, did not 
address the question of definitional overbreadth in his minimal impair-
ment analysis. 
Justice Berger also took a different approach from the majority to 
the balance of his section 1 analysis. To Berger J.A., the question of 
proof was not important. Instead, he found the legislative objective 
behind third party limits to be pressing and substantial according to the 
following logic. First, the justification for the political finance regime in 
the abstract was consistent with other Charter rights. Indeed, the legisla-
tive purpose of the CEA had been said by the Supreme Court in Libman 
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to be “laudable.”67 Second, properly understood, the limits on third party 
spending were designed to prevent damage to the larger political finance 
regime by stopping an avenue for circumvention of candidate and politi-
cal party spending limits. He concluded: 
 The provisions at issue are part of the overall objective of 
Parliament to ensure a fair electoral system. The “harm” posed by 
unregulated third party spending is the damage done to the regime of 
fairness and equity created and maintained by party and candidate 
spending limits. Limiting third party spending is essential to 




Justice Berger went on to conclude that: “[t]he fact that the Lortie 
Commission concluded that its own limit of $1,000 for all third party 
election expenditures would satisfy the minimal impairment test speaks 
strongly in favour of the minimal impairment validity of the provision 
adopted by Parliament.”69 
4.  The Supreme Court 
(a)  The Majority Decision of Bastarache J. 
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, written by 
Bastarache J., begins with an affirmation and elaboration of the political 
theory articulated in Libman. The majority of the Court in Harper 
adopted my term “egalitarian model” to describe an approach to the 
regulation of elections that draws on the political theory of John Rawls 
and other liberal theorists who have participated in the U.S. campaign 
finance reform debates over the past 40 years.
70
 The egalitarian model, 
Bastarache J., explains “is premised on the notion that individuals 
should have an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process. 
Under this model, wealth is the main obstacle to equal participation.”71 
Justice Bastarache went on to explain that the State may implement the 
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egalitarian model by funding candidates and political parties and by 
restricting “voices which dominate the political discourse so that others 
may be heard as well.”72 The Harper majority makes it clear that the 
principles set out in Libman and contested by the Alberta courts are now 
the orthodox position in Canada. 
With the esoteric question of political theory behind him, 
Bastarache J. tackled the more terrestrial issue of whether the impugned 
sections of the CEA 2000 contravened sections 2(b) and 3 of the Char-
ter. Justice Bastarache began with section 3. Section 3, as the Court 
recently articulated in Figueroa, guarantees citizens the right to “mean-
ingful participation” in the electoral process.73 A violation of section 3 
will be found only when a citizen’s right to meaningful participation has 
been compromised. In the context of spending limits, Bastarache J. 
stated the problem as follows: 
 Spending limits … must be carefully tailored to ensure that 
candidates, political parties and third parties are able to convey their 
information to voters. Spending limits which are overly restrictive may 
undermine the informational component of the right to vote. To 
constitute an infringement of the right to vote, these spending limits 
would have to restrict information in such a way as to undermine the 
right of citizens to meaningfully participate in the political process and 
to be effectively represented.
74
 
In Figueroa, the Court found that the inability of small political par-
ties to issue tax receipts to donors and the inability of small party candi-
dates to be identified by party affiliation on ballots infringed citizens’ 
right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.
75
 The re-
strictions in Figueroa were clearly unfair to small political parties and 
their candidates, but they stopped far short of precluding participation in 
the political process. Despite Figueroa’s seemingly low threshold for 
finding that citizens’ right to meaningful participation had been com-
promised, Bastarache J. concluded that the impugned third party spend-
ing limits did not violate section 3. After noting that the trial judge 
found that third parties were precluded from mounting an “effective 
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persuasive campaign,” he dismissively concluded that, “[m]eaningful 
participation in elections is not synonymous with the ability to mount a 
media campaign capable of determining the outcome.”76 
The Court’s analysis in relation to the alleged violation of the right 
to freedom of expression took place entirely in the context of section 1. 
Perhaps what is most notable about the Harper majority is that section 1 
analysis is the deferential approach. Justice Bastarache, citing Thomson 
Newspapers, looked to contextual factors to determine the appropriate 
degree of deference.
77
 The contextual factors considered were: (i) the 
nature of the harm and the inability to measure it; (ii) vulnerability of 
the group; (iii) subjective fears and apprehension of harm; and (iv) the 
nature of the infringed activity — political expression. The last contex-
tual factor appears to have had the most impact on Bastarache J.; it is 
here where he contemplated the egalitarian model. According to 
Bastarache J.: 
 Under the egalitarian model of elections, Parliament must balance 
the rights and privileges of the participants in the electoral process: 
candidates, political parties, third parties and voters…. Given the right 
of Parliament to choose Canada’s electoral model and the nuances 
inherent in implementing this model, the Court must approach the 
justification analysis with deference…. In the end, the electoral 
system, which regulates many aspects of an election, including its 
duration and the control and reimbursement of expenses, reflects a 
political choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.
78
 
Justice Bastarache appears to have predicated his deference to Par-
liament not on a conception of dialogue, but in large part on an innate 
sense that Parliament is in a better position than the Court to regulate the 
political process and, in this case, political expression. 
The majority identified three pressing and substantial objectives 
served by the third party expenditure limits: (i) to promote equality in 
the political discourse; (ii) to protect the integrity of the financing re-
gime applicable to candidates and parties; and (iii) to maintain confi-
dence in the electoral process. Justice Bastarache’s three objectives 
capture the customary arguments made in favour of third party expendi-
                                                                                                                                
76
  Harper (S.C.C.), supra, note 71, at para. 74. 
77
  Id., at para. 76. 
78
  Id., at para. 87 (emphasis added). 
260  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
ture limits. To some degree these objectives are different aspects of the 
same objective. The second objective — protecting the integrity of the 
political finance regime — only matters because the political finance re-
gime fosters the first objective — promoting equality in the political dis-
course. The third objective — maintaining confidence in the political 
process — is only relevant if there is a general consensus that promotion 
of equality in the political discourse is normatively desirable. These 
overlapping objectives are all, to one extent or another, derivative of the 
case for the egalitarian model — the same model upon which 
Bastarache J. predicated his deferential approach to section 1. 
The majority’s minimal impairment analysis began with an obliga-
tory recitation of the prescription in RJR-MacDonald that a law must be 
“carefully tailored” but that “[i]f the law falls within a range of reasona-
ble alternatives, the courts will not find it overbroad merely because 
they can conceive of an alternative which might better tailor objective to 
infringement.”79 With this in mind, the majority identified two contextu-
al factors to support the view that the third party spending limits were 
set at an appropriate level. First, Bastarache J. noted that there are few 
obstacles to individuals joining political parties or creating political 
parties. Presumably, this point was highlighted to suggest that despite 
the third party spending limits there remain channels through which 
political views may be expressed during an election. Second, he noted 
that “lack of means, not legislative restrictions” was the primary obsta-
cle for most individuals even under the third party expenditure limits.
80
 
While Bastarache J. resisted the suggestion of the minority that he was 
arguing that “since the breach of s. 2(b) only affects a few people, it is 
therefore justifiable,” such a conclusion is hard to escape. Justice 
Bastarache took a similar approach to the definitional question, to the 
extent that he dealt with it at all. He noted that the definition of “election 
advertising” does not apply to a number of forms of communications 
such as editorials, debates, speeches, interviews, columns, letters, com-
mentary, the news, and non-commercial use of the Internet. These ex-
clusions, according to Bastarache J., are “highly effective means of 
conveying information.”81 Justice Bastarache went on to conclude that 
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not only were the limits “minimally impairing” but that they “allow for 
meaningful participation in the electoral process and encourage in-
formed voting. The limits promote a free and democratic society.”82 
(b)  The Minority Decision of McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. 
The minority judgment, written by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., 
differs from the majority reasons both in substance and in tone. Like 
Bastarache J., the minority judgment accepts Libman as having settled 
the question of the legitimacy of the legislative objective. In this respect, 
McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. are deferential to Parliament. Unlike 
Bastarache J., however, the minority did not find that Parliament was 
owed any particular deference in the electoral arena with respect to the 
means by which it chose to address its objectives. Harkening back to 
Libman, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. observed that “Here, too, Par-
liament’s good faith is advanced, said to be evidenced by the ongoing 
dialogue with the courts as to where the limits should be set. But as in 
Libman, good faith cannot remedy an impairment of the right to free-
dom of expression.”83  
The minority’s lack of deference throughout the proportionality 
analysis, though most obviously in its consideration of minimal impair-
ment, is founded on two pillars. First, the minority clearly appreciates in 
a way that the majority did not that third parties may bring perspectives 
to the electoral debate that candidates and political parties do not. More-
over, quite apart from an individual’s interest in expressing himself, 
“[p]ermitting an effective voice for unpopular and minority views — 
views political parties may not embrace — is essential to deliberative 
democracy.”84 In other words, from a structural perspective third parties 
play a unique and valuable role. Chief Justice McLachlin and Major J. 
further explained that: 
It is no answer to say that the citizen can speak through a registered 
political party. The citizen may hold views not espoused by a 
registered party. The citizen has a right to communicate those views. 
The right to do so is essential to the effective debate upon which our 
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democracy rests, and lies at the core of the freedom of expression 
guarantee. That does not mean that the right cannot be limited. But it 
does mean that limits on it must be supported by clear and convincing 
demonstration that they are necessary, do not go too far, and enhance 
more than harm the democratic process.
85
 
The second pillar supporting the minority’s lack of deference, which 
is also evident in the preceding quotation, is the overriding importance 
of political expression. Whatever the legitimacy of Parliament’s objec-
tive, the importance of political expression demands that a critical as-
sessment be made of Parliament’s chosen means to achieve the 
objective. According to the minority, a lack of deference was particular-
ly appropriate given that the problem addressed by the third party 
spending limits was only hypothetical.
86
 
The minority did not consider at length the vagueness or 
overbreadth of the third party spending limits. Instead, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Major J. understood the limits to have the broadest possible 
application because of the wide array of issues with which candidates 
and political parties are typically associated.
87
 For the minority, the 
debate over issue advocacy was irrelevant because of its conclusion that 
there was no evidence that indicated that partisan third party advocacy 
was a problem. The broad definition of “associated” together with the 
meagre monetary limits prescribed by the third party spending limits led 
the minority to conclude that “the problem … is that the draconian na-
ture of the infringement — to effectively deprive all those who do not or 
cannot speak through political parties of their voice during an election 
period — overshoots the perceived danger.”88 
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 
1.  The Limits of the Egalitarian Model 
(a)  The Duality of Third Parties in the Electoral Debate and the  
Motives for Regulation 
Viewed from a structural perspective, third parties can play both an 
important role and a dangerous role in the political process. Some third 
parties are an important catalyst for debate while others may be little 
more than a device for evading the political finance regime. An ideal 
regulation of third party spending would facilitate third parties’ debate 
catalyst function and limit the propensity of third parties to destabilize 
the political finance regime. The duality of third parties in the political 
process is an essential part of the context that must be understood when 
considering the constitutionality of third party spending limits. The 
duality of third parties, however, is inadequately understood by the 
majority in Harper. 
The political finance regime’s egalitarian objectives can be justified 
on the grounds it is reasonable to assume that over time that third party 
advocacy activities will be biased toward the interests of private wealth. 
Essentially, private wealth enjoys an advantage in agenda setting. Such 
a threat is not as direct a threat to inequality as political contributions to 
candidates and political parties. Furthermore, the argument that private 
wealth can dominate agenda setting through third party expenditures, 
however logical, is not substantiated by empirical evidence. The most 
immediate and direct threat posed by third parties to political equality is 
to the integrity of the political finance regime. Third party activities 
imperil the political finance regime by threatening to undermine the 
relative deliberative equality among candidates and political parties. The 
political finance regime creates a context within which major parties and 
their candidates and even to some extent minor parties and their candi-
dates are ensured a rough parity of resources through public funding and 
free broadcasting and are subject to similar expenditure limits. Cam-
paigns by third parties may intentionally or unintentionally parallel 
political party campaigns in message and objective. In an environment 
where third party expenditures are not controlled, a third party commu-
nications campaign that promotes or opposes a candidate or political 
party may threaten the integrity of candidate and political party spend-
ing limits by creating an incentive for avoidance on the part of the tar-
geted candidate or political party. Such avoidance might take the form 
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of non-compliance with candidate and political party spending limits or 
through a responding third party attack. Essentially, the involvement of 
a third party can upset the détente imposed by the Elections Act and 
prompt an arms race between candidates and political parties. Even if 
avoidance of the political finance regime does not become widespread, 
the perception of unfairness may result in the repeal of third party 
spending limits. Either result jeopardizes the larger egalitarian mission 
of the political finance regime. 
Candidates and political parties may, from time to time, have a 
common interest in not debating a particular issue. Such a common 
interest may stem from an issue being perceived as a “loser” for all 
candidates and parties, or perhaps it is an issue that is “too hot to han-
dle,” or it may be that the issue concerns an aspect of the political pro-
cess itself such as Parliamentary pensions and salaries. Third parties, 
unlike candidates and political parties, are not inhibited from raising 
controversial subjects by concern for their electoral fate nor do they 
have a vested interest in the political process itself. Third parties are, 
therefore, uniquely positioned to criticize the status quo and the shared 
values of candidates and political parties. For example, third parties can 
effectively attack government waste and corruption in a way that candi-
dates and political parties cannot or will not. When third parties function 
in this manner they broaden political discourse and enhance the value of 
citizens’ democratic rights. Accepting that the regulation of third party 
electoral activities is egalitarian in purpose does not mean that there are 
no other legislative motives at play. Candidates and political parties, 
particularly incumbents, share a common interest in reducing the chanc-
es of the unexpected. Safe campaigns serve the interests of candidates 
and political parties, not citizens. The catalyst function of third parties 
that is so vital to enhancing political debate is also a potentially destabi-
lizing force in a campaign. The possibility that legislators might be 
tempted by self-interest to enact third party spending limits that are 
more stringent than are necessary to serve the egalitarian objectives of 
the political finance regime cannot be discounted. 
(b)  Issue Advocacy 
Third party electoral communications can be divided into two gen-
eral types: partisan advocacy and issue advocacy. Partisan advocacy, as 
the term suggests, refers to communications that expressly promote or 
oppose a candidate or political party. Partisan advocacy is the type of 
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third party activity that poses a threat to the integrity of the larger politi-
cal finance regime. Issue advocacy refers to communications concerning 
issues, not candidates or political parties. Issue advocacy, as it has come 
to be understood in the United States, can itself be divided into two 
categories: “pure” issue advocacy and “sham” issue advocacy.89 In prac-
tice, the distinction between pure and sham issue advocacy is not always 
easy to make. 
Pure issue advocacy is electoral communications that do not seek to 
persuade a listener to vote for or against a particular candidate or politi-
cal party. An example of pure issue advocacy from the 2000 federal 
election is “Canada’s Health Care,” an advertisement placed by the 
Canadian Medical Association in The Globe and Mail and which read as 
follows: 
Canada’s Health Care: Planning a Full Recovery 
Join with Canada’s physicians to help make [the Canadian Medical 
Association’s ideas for a better health care system] a reality, by letting 
your voice be heard during this election. [Here are] some things that 
you can do: 
1. Send your idea of an ideal health care system to us. We’ll post 
them on our web-site, and send them all to Canada’s political 
leaders. 
2. Tell your local candidates about the health system you want, and 
ask what they’ll do to make it happen. 
3. Write, email, phone hot line shows, go to meetings, and then 
make your vote count.
90
 
No issue advocacy can be wholly neutral. The CMA’s “Canada’s 
Healthcare” was undoubtedly more consistent with some political par-
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ties’ positions in the 2000 federal election than others. Even so, the 
advertisement is non-partisan. Issue advocacy fundamentally differs 
from partisan advocacy in that its primary objective is promotion of 
political debate, not promotion of or opposition to a candidate or politi-
cal party. 
Sham issue advocacy is, like its name suggests, not really issue ad-
vocacy at all. Sham issue advocacy is thinly-veiled partisan advocacy. 
Advertisements that describe an issue in the context of a candidate or 
political party’s position on the issue and portrays that position in either 
a positive or negative light are sham issue advocacy. A classic example 
of sham issue advocacy was placed by the Grand Council for the Crees 
in The Globe and Mail two days prior to the 2000 federal election: 
I Encourage Aboriginal Citizens to Vote in the Federal Election. 
Jean Chretien’s Liberal Platform 
1. continue to work with aboriginal peoples to address the economic 
and social problems they face; 
2. promote aboriginal languages; 
3. build and strengthen relations with aboriginal peoples; 
4. promote aboriginal economic skill development and prosperous 
aboriginal economies. 
Stockwell Day’s plans for us we all know. 
Gilles Duceppe’s agenda for aboriginals in Canada is also well known. 
*** 
By voting we may determine decisions that will impact the future of 




The explanation of Jean Chretien’s program in positive terms and the 
programs of Stockwell Day and Gilles Duceppe in dismissive terms 
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clearly indicated that Aboriginal citizens should not only vote, but vote 
Liberal. 
If the dual nature of third parties in the political process and the dis-
tinction between pure and issue advocacy are accepted, it may be con-
cluded that in the abstract there is a case for limiting sham issue 
advocacy, but little or no case for limiting pure issue advocacy. Partisan 
advocacy and sham issue advocacy pose a threat to the stability of other 
political finance controls, while issue advocacy primarily enables third 
parties to be catalysts for expanded political debate. The only argument 
for regulating pure issue advocacy is pragmatic; essentially, it must be 
argued that it is impossible to intelligently distinguish between sham 
issue advocacy and pure issue advocacy.
92
 This argument was not con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in Harper. 
(c)  The Paradox of Political Expression in Elections 
Political expression in elections, even before the Charter, was rec-
ognized to be perhaps the most essential form of expression. Chief Jus-
tice Duff, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Alberta Press case observed: 
Under the constitution established by The British North America Act, 
legislative power for Canada is vested in one Parliament consisting of 
the Sovereign, an upper house styled the Senate, and the House of 
Commons….. The statute contemplates a parliament working under 
the influence of public opinion and public discussion. There can be no 
controversy that such institutions derive their efficacy from the free 
public discussion of affairs, from criticism and answer and counter-
criticism, from attack upon policy and administration and defence and 
counter-attack; from the freest and fullest analysis and examination 
from every point of view of political proposals. This is signally true in 
respect of the discharge … by members of Parliament of their duty to 
the electors, and by the electors themselves of their responsibilities in 
the election of their representatives.
93
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The idea that political expression is “core expression” is a recurring 
theme in Charter section 2(b) cases. The clearest articulation of this 
view is found in Dickson C.J.’s remarks in Keegstra where he noted 
that: “The connection between freedom of expression and the political 
process is perhaps the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee, and the nature of 
this connection is largely derived from the Canadian commitment to 
democracy.”94 The importance of political expression, in most instances, 
would seem to override competing legislative objectives. 
The potential problem of wealth dominating the political agenda ex-
ists outside the electoral context. This concern, however, is not suffi-
cient to justify limits on political expression outside an election period. 
Accordingly, egalitarian concerns alone do not explain the reason for a 
deferential approach to the regulation of electoral expression. A neces-
sary complement to egalitarian principles is the idea that political ex-
pression is too important not to be regulated in some respects during 
elections. This is the paradox of political expression in elections. Politi-
cal expression in election campaigns is so closely connected to the exer-
cise of democratic rights that concern about improper influence on 
debate is heightened. Electoral expression is fundamentally different 
than normal political discourse in that it takes place within a defined 
time period, is subject to myriad rules, and is ancillary to an expressive 
act — voting — that is both highly regulated and constitutionally pro-
tected. Elections are an artificial context created for a specific purpose 
and dependent on State action.
95
 Edwin Baker expressed this argument 
in the following terms: 
elections are part of a formal, legally structured realm of the 
governmental apparatus. Campaign speech is a central part of this 
electoral realm. For this reason, campaign speech must be 
distinguished from the much broader category of political speech or 
speech about public issues.
96
 
Frederick Schauer and Richard Pildes term this argument “electoral 
exceptionalism”: 
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According to electoral exceptionalism, elections should be 
constitutionally understood as (relatively) bounded domains of 
communicative activity. Because of the defined scope of this activity, 
it would be possible to prescribe or apply First Amendment principles 
to electoral processes that do not necessarily apply through the full 
reach of the First Amendment. If electoral exceptionalism prevails, 
courts evaluating restrictions on speech that is part of the process of 
nominating and electing candidates would employ a different standard 
from what we might otherwise characterize as the normal, or baseline, 
degree of First Amendment scrutiny.
97
 
The great danger of the electoral exceptionalism argument is that it may 
be applied too broadly. If electoral exceptionalism is indeed central to 
the Court’s reasoning in Harper and it is accepted that political expres-
sion is as important as the Court explained in the Alberta Press case and 
in Keegstra, then the Court should be careful to limit its application to 
electoral expression. Political expression outside the electoral context 
cannot be limited on the grounds that the limit somehow improves elec-
toral debate. To cabin the electoral exceptionalism argument the Court 
must draw a line between political expression generally and electoral 
expression. It may be impossible to draw a bright line, but every effort 
must be made to limit electoral exceptionalism to its proper context. 
(d)  The Margins of the Electoral Context and the Failure of the Court 
in Harper 
The Court in Harper explicitly accepted the egalitarian model and 
seemingly accepted the basic premise of the electoral exceptionalism 
argument. The Court concluded its explanation why deference to Par-
liament was appropriate by stating that: “In the end, the electoral sys-
tem, which regulates many aspects of an election, including its duration 
and the control and reimbursement of expenses, reflects a political 
choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.”98 While this is 
not an explicit endorsement of electoral exceptionalism, it certainly 
appears to be an acceptance of the view that elections are an artificial 
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end-driven context within which limits on what would otherwise be core 
expression are necessary and expected. 
Accepting for the moment that deference is warranted in the elec-
toral context, the most obvious problems with the third party expendi-
ture limit in the CEA 2000 are definitional. There are two doctrinal 
rubrics under which the definitional problems with CEA 2000 third 
party spending limits can be considered: vagueness and overbreadth. 
Vagueness and definitional overbreadth are closely related concepts. A 
vague law is a threat to the rule of law because it creates the risk of 
arbitrary and capricious enforcement.
99
 A law must be sufficiently clear 
that it gives citizens fair warning so that they may govern their conduct 
so as to comply with the law. Definitional overbreadth presents a similar 
danger in that a law that is overbroad is susceptible to enforcement 
according to unstated and arbitrary principles. The classic example is a 
law prohibiting loitering that is enforced against teenage males at night, 
but not against parishioners mingling outside Church on a Sunday morn-
ing.
100
 In the Charter context, vagueness is considered as a threshold 
question under section 1 where the Court asks the question whether a 
provision is a “limit prescribed by law.” Overbreadth is typically con-
sidered a question of minimal impairment under the section 1 propor-
tionality analysis. For the purposes of this paper and consideration of the 
limits of the electoral exceptionalism argument, the relevant concern is 
not vagueness, but definitional overbreadth. In particular, the question is 
to what extent the breadth of the third party spending limits exceed the 
underlying legislative objective. 
Canadian courts have been reluctant to find laws vague. Instead, 
courts are inclined to give laws their most plausible meaning, which is 
often the broadest meaning possible, and to consider whether the law is 
overbroad in the context of the minimal impairment analysis. The Court 
in Harper followed this approach as it confronted the definitional prob-
lems with the third party spending limits. The Court held: “[w]hether the 
definition is impermissibly broad is a matter for legal debate and is more 
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properly considered at the minimal impairment stage of the justification 
analysis.”101 
By postponing consideration of difficult definitional questions to the 
minimal impairment stage of its analysis, the Court risks avoiding a 
reckoning with the true meaning of a statutory provision. Indeed, the 
majority in Harper never returns to the definitional question in its min-
imal impairment analysis.
102
 The Court’s discussion of minimal impair-
ment is almost entirely concerned with whether the financial limits were 
set at the appropriate levels. No consideration is given to the question of 
the definitional breadth of the third party spending limits. The question 
of whether non-electoral political expression is captured is not consid-
ered nor is the question of whether the law exceeded the underlying 
legislative objective addressed. 
When contemplating the breadth of the third party restrictions in the 
CEA 2000, the Court should have, at a minimum, considered the context 
within which third parties operate. The most obvious contextual issue is: 
How broad is the limit in practice? In other words, is there any unregu-
lated space during an election campaign and, if so, how much? The 
majority did not explicitly consider the breadth of the provision in the 
context of determining whether the third party spending limits were 
prescribed by law; however, certain comments suggest that the majority 
considered the limit to apply to something less than all political expres-
sion during an election period. In particular, the majority noted that 
“[w]hile no specific criteria exist, it is possible to determine whether an 
issue is associated with a candidate or political party and, therefore, to 
delineate an area of risk. For example, it is possible to discern whether 
an issue is associated with a candidate or political party from their plat-
form.”103 
The majority’s implicit view that the third party spending limit ex-
tended to something less than all political expression during an election 
campaign, was rejected by the minority. The minority, unlike the major-
ity, turns its mind to how elections really work: 
Section 350(2)(d) is particularly restrictive. It prohibits individuals 
from spending more than the allowed amounts on any issue with 
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which a candidate is “particularly associated.” The candidates in an 
election are typically associated with a wide range of views on a wide 
range of issues. The evidence shows that the effect of the limits is to 
prevent citizens from effectively communicating their views on issues 
during an election campaign.
104
 
The minority probably understates the breadth of the third party spend-
ing limits in practice. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a political issue dur-
ing an election that is not “associated” or even “particularly associated” 
with a political party or candidate. If the minority’s understanding of the 
definition of the third party spending limitation is accepted, it is impos-
sible to conclude anything other than that the definition exceeds the 
scope of the underlying legislative objective. The definitional breadth of 
the third party spending limits is every bit as much of a constitutional 
problem as the modest financial limits. 
There are two other contextual considerations that illustrate the 
overbroad and capricious nature of the third party spending restriction 
and that escaped the Court’s notice. First, elections may arise unexpect-
edly and wrong foot third parties with regularly scheduled advertising 
campaigns. Third parties, as the Court noted,
105
 may advertise without 
restriction prior to the commencement of an electoral period. One of the 
central features of our Parliamentary system, however, is that there are 
no set election dates. Consider for a moment the predicament of a hypo-
thetical third party that invested funds in excess of the permitted 
amounts to develop an advertising campaign and purchased significant 
television broadcasting time several months in advance. After the third 
party’s investment in developing the campaign with an advertising 
agency and purchase of television time, but before the campaign runs on 
television an election is called for the period in which the third party 
advertising campaign was planned. A third party in such a situation has 
two choices: (1) break the law and run its campaign; or (2) delay or 
cancel its campaign and suffer a financial loss. Neither of these alterna-
tives are fair to an individual or organization complying with the law 
prior to the issue of the election writ. 
Second, consider the predicament of a third party that plans an ad-
vertising campaign during an election period in excess of the prescribed 
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financial limits on an issue that is not associated with a political party or 
particularly associated with any candidate. The hypothetical third party 
invests its resources in preparing the advertising campaign and purchas-
ing broadcast time or advertising space in a publication. However, in the 
midst of the campaign and before the third party is able to run its adver-
tisements, a political party announces that it adopts the third party’s 
issue as its own thus becoming “associated” with the issue. Just as in the 
case of the third party surprised by an election, a third party whose issue 
is usurped by a political party in mid-campaign is potentially in viola-
tion of the third party expenditure limits. This hypothetical example is 
not a remote possibility. Indeed, the emergence of issues over a cam-
paign period is part of the ordinary function of democratic debate. Issues 
are not frozen in place at the commencement of a campaign or even in 
the platform documents of the various political parties. 
2. Political Process Theory 
(a)  Process Theory and Political Markets 
One of the great debates in constitutional theory in the 20th century 
was over the question of whether judicial review was democratic. Is it 
legitimate for an appointed Court to invalidate laws passed by a demo-
cratically elected legislature? Alexander Bickel famously termed this 
quandary the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”106 The short answer to 
this problem in the Canadian context is that Canada is not a pure democ-
racy; it is a constitutional democracy. The Supreme Court made this 
abundantly clear in the Secession Reference where it outlined four prin-
ciples — democracy, federalism, respect for minority rights, and consti-
tutionalism and the rule of law — that together define Canada’s political 
being.
107
 Even if we accept that the big question posed by Bickel and 
others has been answered by the Court, the practical question of the 
relationship between Parliament and the Court remains. To what extent 
can the Court interfere with Parliament’s choices? And to what extent 
should the Court respect Parliament’s choices? 
                                                                                                                                
106
  A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (In-
dianapolis: Bobs-Merrill, 1962), at 16. 
107
  Secession Reference, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 49. 
274  Supreme Court Law Review (2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
One approach to reconciling judicial review with democracy that 
has largely been overlooked in Canada is process theory. Process theo-
ries, such as that of John Hart Ely, hold that the U.S. Constitution (and 
for the sake of argument we will assume that this statement applies 
equally to the Constitution of Canada) is fundamentally democratic. All 
process theories hold, in essence, that a Constitution should be princi-
pally a guarantee of procedural fairness and that the Court’s role is to 
enforce that guarantee. If Courts enforce a guarantee of procedural fair-
ness, it is often argued, substantively fair results will inevitably follow. 
By enforcing a process guarantee instead of deciding cases based on 
substantive values, the Court respects the democratic will of the legisla-
ture to make normative choices. 
Ely’s process theory was inspired by the fourth footnote in United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.
108
 The footnote itself is not clearly 
expressed and is subject to interpretation. A general consensus, howev-
er, has emerged through extensive academic debate that the footnote 
provides essentially that there should be little deference shown in review 
of three types of legislation: (1) laws that infringe textually enumerated 
constitutional rights; (2) legislation which restricts those political pro-
cesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation; and (3) laws that discriminate on the basis of race, 
religion, or national origin.
109
  
The famous footnote has been credited by some as articulating the 
post-New Deal approach to judicial review. Owen Fiss, for example, 
called the footnote “the great and modern charter for ordering the rela-
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tion between judges and other agencies of government.”110 The foot-
note’s fame is in no small part due to Ely making it the centrepiece of 
his process theory. 
Ely called his approach to judicial review a “representation-
reinforcing theory.”111 What Ely meant by this was that the Court should 
concern “itself only with questions of participation, and not with the 
substantive merits of the political choice under attack.”112 While “partic-
ipation” is a vague notion, Ely made it clear that he envisioned the Court 
as functioning in the political sphere much like the Competition Tribu-
nal in the economic domain combating monopolistic behaviour. As Ely 
explained: 
[t]he approach to constitutional adjudication recommended here is 
akin to what might be called an “antitrust” as opposed to a 
“regulatory” orientation to economic affairs — rather than dictate 
substantive results it intervenes only when the “market,” in our case 
the political market, is systemically malfunctioning. (A referee 
analogy is also not far off: the referee is to intervene only when one 
team is gaining unfair advantage, not because the “wrong” team has 
scored.)… Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of 
trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change 
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though 
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to 
an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority 
out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize 
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the 
protection afforded other groups by a representative system.
113
 
Participation, to Ely, is enhanced by preventing the “ins” from manipu-
lating the political system in their favour. He went on to explain that a 
court is much better placed than a legislature to determine when there is 
a malfunction in the political market. Ely remarked, “[o]bviously our 
elected representatives are the last persons we should trust with identifi-
cation of either of these situations.”114 
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Ely’s work grappled with the Warren Court’s minority rights juris-
prudence and, particularly, those decisions concerning minority rights in 
the political process. Ely’s process theory, for all its promise, did not 
elaborate in any detail how courts should approach political process 
questions generally. His “work remained relatively undeveloped regard-
ing the application of process theory to the core functioning of the polit-
ical process, an inquiry that has advanced significantly since the 
emergence of the study of political governance as a distinct inquiry in 
constitutional law.”115 Indeed, as noted in the second part of this paper, 
one of the notable developments in the study of law and the democratic 
process has been the revival of process theory. 
The most notable extension of Ely’s process theory to emerge from 
the body of law and the democratic process scholarship is the “political 
markets” approach advocated by Samuel Issacharoff and Richard 
Pildes.
116
 Issacharoff and Pildes adopted a competition-based model, but 
did not use Ely’s anti-trust analogy. Instead, they preferred to conceive 
of elected representatives as analogous to corporate managers. The 
problem of management entrenchment in corporate law through the use 
of “poison pills,” “break fees,” and super-majority requirements, they 
argued, is no different than political representatives entrenching them-
selves through gerrymanders, political finance laws, or other regulations 
of the political process. To support this view, Issacharoff and Pildes 
drew upon public choice scholarship that concluded that the “legislative 
process [is] an arena for fundamentally self-serving behavior.”117 While 
such a dim view of human nature is undoubtedly incorrect in many 
individual cases, as a generalization it delineates a genuine structural 
risk.  
Corporate law deals with the risk of self-serving behaviour and en-
trenchment by managers in two ways. First, the law imposes fiduciary 
obligations on directors and officers. Second, the law favours conditions 
that support open contests for control. According to Issacharoff and 
Pildes, this latter means of shaping the behaviour of corporate managers 
is the most instructive for the study of law and the democratic process. 
They explained their approach in the following terms: 
                                                                                                                                
115
  Dorf & Issacharoff, “Can Process Theory Constrain Courts?” supra, note 109, at 928. 
116
  S. Issacharoff & R. Pildes, “Politics as Markets” supra, note 6. 
117
  Id., at 650. 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) Expression and the Democratic Process 277 
 
[P]olitics shares with all markets a vulnerability to anticompetitive 
behavior. In political markets, anticompetitive entities alter the rules of 
engagement to protect established powers from the risk of successful 
challenge. This market analogy may be pushed one step further if we 
view elected officials and dominant parties as a managerial class, 
imperfectly accountable through periodic review to a diffuse body of 
equity holders known as the electorate. 
Like the managerial class well-known to the laws of corporate 
governance, these political managers readily identify their stewardship 
with the interests of the corporate body they lead. Like their corporate 
counterparts, they act in the name of the entity to protect themselves 
against outside challenges to their personal authority. Again, like their 
corporate counterparts, political managers use procedural devices, 
created in their incumbent capacity, to lock up their control.
118
 
Issacharoff and Pildes concluded that a structural approach to judicial 
review — ensuring that political markets are competitive — is prefera-
ble to an individual rights approach to judicial review. This conclusion 
has been controversial,
119
 but is not essential for the position advanced 
in this paper. Instead, it is enough to take from the political markets 
approach that judicial review must be guided, at least in part, by a sensi-
tivity to the threat posed by self-serving behaviour by legislators. By 
making a link to two unrelated disciplines, public choice scholarship 
and corporate law, political markets provide a more detailed and com-
pelling account than Ely why politicians should be distrusted. Even if it 
is not accepted that structural considerations should prevail over indi-
vidual rights analysis, political markets indicate that a more searching 
standard of judicial review may be appropriate when such a risk is iden-
tified. 
(b)  The Egalitarian Model and “Process Theory Lite” 
The most obvious question that can be asked in the Canadian con-
text is: How can process theory be reconciled with the explicitly norma-
tive analysis favoured by the Supreme Court of Canada? And, in the 
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particular context of the democratic process, how can process theory co-
exist with the egalitarian model? These questions are not unique to the 
Canadian context. For the purpose of this paper, the proposition ad-
vanced is that a form of process theory is germane to the review of the 
laws that govern the democratic process. No broader claim for the rele-
vance of process theory is made. Even at that, the argument here is that 
process theory is consistent with the egalitarian model and at least some 
of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent democratic process case law. 
The most trenchant criticism of process theory is that judgments 
about fair processes are inherently substantive even though they may 
pretend not to be.
120
 In other words, process theory is covertly substan-
tive. The effect of this criticism is not to deny the utility of process theo-
ry in democratic process cases; rather, it begs the question of what 
normative theory of democracy informs judgments about fair processes. 
The way forward, however, is not to see substantive and process theo-
ries as being inherently opposed.
121
 Michael Dorf argues that Ely recog-
nized that his theory of judicial review, notwithstanding its emphasis on 
process, was rooted in an underlying substantive theory of democracy 
— the liberal democracy that he lived in.122 While process theory is not 
normally associated with robust theories of democracy, there is no in-
herent reason why that is so. The recognition that a substantive theory of 
democracy must inevitably inform process theory enables it to be recon-
ciled in some form with the Supreme Court of Canada’s democratic 
process jurisprudence dominated as it is by the egalitarian model. 
Perhaps the best example of the marriage of process theory and a 
robust theory of democracy is found in Patrick Monahan’s Politics and 
the Constitution. Monahan, like Ely, disclaims a substantive approach to 
constitutional interpretation. Monahan argues that “[t]he resolution of 
Charter issues is not to be found in the philosophies of John Rawls, 
Robert Nozick or Ronald Dworkin.” Following in Ely’s footsteps, Mo-
nahan finds democracy to be the most persuasive interpretive guide to 
the interpretation of the Charter. He even suggests, that process theory is 
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more suited to the Charter than it is to the U.S. Constitution because of 
its explicit emphasis on democracy and relative lack of provisions guar-
anteeing substantive values.
123
 Monahan’s understanding of democracy, 
however, appears more robust than Ely’s. He writes: 
Democracy implies more than simply popular rule. It means, in 
addition, a broadening of the opportunities for, and the scope of, 
collective deliberation and debate in a political community; it means 
identifying and reducing the barriers to effective and equal 
participation in the process by all citizens; it means ensuring that there 




To some extent, Monahan’s concept of democracy may be influenced 
by his second interpretive principle, communitarianism. The robustness 
of Monahan’s conception of democracy is evident in his discussion of 
the Alberta Court’s consideration of third party spending restrictions in 
National Citizens Coalition v. Canada. “How might a democratic theory 
along the lines I propose deal with the issue of election campaign fi-
nance?”125 Monahan asks rhetorically. His answer is telling: 
If we begin with the proposition that freedom is not simply the 
absence of restraint, it becomes possible to conceive of the regulation 
of campaign finance as ameliorating freedom rather than limiting it. 
The point of the legislation is to restrict the ability of certain wealthy 
groups or interests to dominate election campaigns through the 
expenditure of money. The legislation is designed to ensure that no 
one political perspective is permitted to drown out the competing 
messages in the electoral marketplace. This justification becomes 
convincing once you push beyond questions of formal access and 




The foregoing passage echoes the Rawlsian democratic theory upon 
which the egalitarian model draws.
127
 The compatibility between those 
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aspects of Rawls’ theory of justice that touch upon the democratic pro-
cess and Ely’s process theory is not as strange as it might seem at first 
glance.
128
 Rawls’ argument for the control of the influence of wealth in 
the democratic process (and similar arguments made by many other 
liberal scholars) is in some respects process-based and inspired by the 
same anti-trust concepts that informed Ely’s view. Ely’s view is that the 
political process must be kept open so that there is a competition for 
political power. This competition, he surmises, provides the means by 
which more substantive objectives, the realization of minority rights for 
example, might be achieved. Rawls goes farther. Rawls argues that 
economic disparities will inevitably be manifested in a disparity of polit-
ical power. This is particularly problematic because the Ins can manipu-
late the system to further enhance their political and economic power at 
the expense of the Outs. Rawls writes: “Political power rapidly accumu-
lates and becomes unequal; and making use of the coercive apparatus of 
the state and its law, those who gain the advantage can often assure 
themselves of a favored position.”129 
Monahan’s democratic theory, like Ely’s, shares some characteris-
tics with that of Rawls. Moreover, his analysis of the National Citizens 
Coalition case suggests that his conception of democracy is more robust 
than Ely’s, perhaps even consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
egalitarian model. Even if Monahan’s democratic theory can be seen to 
be consistent with the egalitarian model, it is not clear if he would advo-
cate deference in the review of Parliament’s matching of means and 
ends. He pointed out that “[o]ne need not use a sledgehammer to kill a 
fly,”130 but at the same time expressed concern about the ability of 
courts to make complex factual and normative judgments in the context 
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of section 1 proportionality analysis.
131
 For a more fully developed 
approach to judicial review in democratic process cases we must look 
farther afield. 
One possible source of a fully formed approach of judicial review in 
democratic process cases that incorporates aspects of process theory is 
found in Richard Hasen’s recent book, The Supreme Court and Election 
Law.
132
 Hasen, a critic of pure process theory and political markets, has 
articulated an alternative approach to judicial review in democratic 
process cases in the United States. The approach espoused by Hasen is 
limited to equality questions; however, this limit is not as constricting as 
it might seem because most democratic process cases can be reduced to 
questions of political equality. According to Hasen, political equality 
rights can be divided into two kinds: core equality rights and contested 
equality rights. Core equality rights are the minimal requirements of a 
democratic government such as a right to an equal vote. Hasen argues 
that core rights are those upon which there is a social consensus or near 
consensus. Contested rights in the U.S. context considered by Hasen 
include campaign finance controls and other election regulations where 
there is no current social consensus. The dependence of Hasen’s classi-
fications on social values makes his theory portable in the sense that if it 
is applied in a different context, for example, in Canada, the same val-
ues need not be classified as core and contested. The obvious problem 
with Hasen’s core/contested dichotomy is whether or not in practice a 
distinction can be drawn between the two categories.
133
 
Hasen argues that only core political equality rights should be con-
stitutionalized. By this he means that core political equality rights are 
those that may be protected by the Court if the legislature fails to do so. 
In the event the Court finds that the right in question is a core political 
equality right, there should be no deference to the State. If the Court 
finds that the asserted right is a contested political equality right, the 
Court should defer to the State’s judgment in a way that does not pre-
clude a legislature subsequently stepping in to protect the contested 
political equality right. In this way, the Court allows for an evolution in 
the social consensus and the possibility that the contested political 
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equality right will become a core political equality right. When consid-
ering a legislative act that purports to further a contested political 
equality right, Hasen suggests, the Court should engage in “careful 
balancing of interests.” Hasen goes on to explain: 
In the case of a legislative body’s voluntary imposition of a contested 
vision of political equality, the Court should be deferential to (but not 
a rubber stamp of) the value judgments about the balance between 
equality and other interests made by the legislative body while at the 
same time be skeptical about the means by which the legislative body 
purports to enforce the contested equality right.
134
 
The scepticism of legislative means prescribed by Hasen is predicated 
on the potential abuses that may arise from self-serving behaviour of 
elected representatives. In particular, he warns:  
... the Court must be especially careful of measures that legislatures 
enact in the name of political equality. The potential for self-interested 
legislation lurks behind all election laws and the courts must 
skeptically inquire whether the means of achieving equality closely fit 
the ends of the law. This skepticism serves as a substitute for a probe 
of legislative “motive” in passing these election laws.
135
 
So while Hasen’s approach to judicial review of democratic process 
cases is set up as an alternative to process theory and political markets, 
one of the main tenets of process theory — distrust of political repre-
sentatives — plays an important role in the approach he recommends. 
As will be explained in the next section, an approach akin to Hasen’s 
approach to contested political equality rights is consistent with the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s recent jurisprudence of the democratic 
process, though notably not with its approach to Harper. 
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3. Process Theory Lite and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Recent 
Democratic Process Cases 
(a)  Deference to Democratic Values, Not Legislative Means 
The early democratic process cases under the Charter where sub-
stantial reasons were given — Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries, 
Haig, and Harvey — are notably deferential. Saskatchewan Electoral 
Boundaries and Haig are not deferential in the context of section 1, but 
rather in acquiescing to Parliament’s limited definition of the right in 
question.
136
 Justice McLachlin, as she then was, in defining the nature of 
the right to vote in Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries countenanced 
deviations from average electoral district populations of plus or minus 
25 per cent as a matter of course and allowed that even greater devia-
tions could be justified under section 1. In doing so, she neglected to 
note the self-serving motives behind the Saskatchewan legislation and 
the partisan implications of her decision.
137
 The Court in Haig found 
that the right to vote in a referendum was not protected by the section 3 
right to vote and, in the specific context of the referenda in question, 
neither section 2(b) nor section 15(1) provided any protection. The plu-
rality decision in Harvey found that a restriction on an individual con-
victed of an election offence from serving in the legislature contravened 
section 3, but was justified. LaForest J. wrote: 
A degree of deference is especially appropriate in this case where the 
impugned legislative provisions are aimed at transgressing members of 
the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly. Surely the members of that 
body are in the best position to choose between available options when 
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it comes to deterring other members from breaching the trust that 
exists between them, the electorate, and the House as a whole.
138
 
The Court appeared to maintain a deferential approach in Libman in con-
sidering third party expenditure limits in the context of provincial referen-
dum legislation. The Court termed the legislative objective — limiting the 
influence of wealth in the political process — “laudable.”139 Despite the 
deferential stance toward Parliament’s assessment of the objective of the 
legislation, the specific limits were found to be too restrictive. The Court 
employed a similar approach in Thomson Newspapers where the constitu-
tionality of a ban on publication of opinion polls was in issue, though with 
a less deferential tone.
140
 Two main purposes were offered by the gov-
ernment in support of the publication ban: (1) the necessity of a rest peri-
od prior to an election where no opinion polls could be published so that 
voters could deliberate; and (2) the risk of a misleading poll that could not 
be corrected prior to election day. Justice Bastarache, writing for the 
majority of the Court, refused to accept the first objective but found the 
second objective plausible despite a lack of evidence. Even though he 
found that misleading polls were potentially harmful to voters, he refused 
to defer to Parliament’s choice of means to address the problem. Justice 
Bastarache was particularly concerned that Parliament could have sub-
stantially addressed the perceived harm by requiring publication of meth-
odological data together with all polls to enable voters to critically assess 
the information. He concluded, “[t]he failure to address or explain the 
reason for not adopting a significantly less intrusive measure which ap-
pears as effective as that actually adopted weighs heavily against the 
justifiability of this provision.”141  
Even more recently in the context of a section 3 challenge to limits 
on the rights of prisoners to vote in Sauvé the Court observed that, “[t]he 
right to vote is fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and 
cannot be lightly set aside. Limits on it require not deference, but careful 
examination.”142 The Court nevertheless accepted Parliament’s stated 
objective as pressing and substantial (though with a healthy degree of 
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scepticism) and proceeded to find the means chosen by Parliament to be 
unacceptable. The Court’s most recent section 3 case, Figueroa,143 fol-
lows the same pattern. The legislative provisions in issue in Figueroa 
limited the rights of small political parties to issue tax receipts and the 
candidates of small political parties to be identified by their party affilia-
tion on the ballot. Just as in Sauvé, Iacobucci J. writing for the majority 
viewed the legislature’s proffered objectives with scepticism, but al-
lowed that the objectives could in some circumstances be pressing and 
substantial. Justice Iacobucci went on to find that the legislative provi-
sions did not pass the proportionality aspects of the section 1 analysis. 
The Court’s approach to section 1 in Libman, Thomson Newspapers, 
Sauvé, and Figueroa can be characterized as deferential to Parliament’s 
assessment of democratic values, but sceptical of Parliament’s choice of 
means to achieve its objectives. The minority decision in Harper, re-
viewed earlier in this paper, follows the same approach. What is lacking 
from each of these cases is a principled basis for deferring to Parliament 
in one aspect of the section 1 analysis but not another. The most obvious 
explanation for the Court’s deference in the first part of the section 1 
analysis in these cases is that the Court believes that Parliament is the 
appropriate body to assess the values that inform the structure of the 
Canadian democratic process. The Court’s deference to Parliament in 
this regard is made easy by the fact that the political philosophy that 
forms the intellectual underpinnings of the democratic system is gener-
ally consistent with the Court’s democratic theory. 
The Court’s lack of deference in the proportionality aspect of the 
section 1 analysis is harder to explain. Certainly one can discern specific 
reasons for a sceptical approach in each case, but what is needed is a 
larger explanation. The best explanation, however, is one that cannot be 
found in the Court’s words. The reason why the Court should be scepti-
cal of Parliament’s choice of means is the inherent conflict of interest in 
Members of Parliament setting the rules of the political game. This is 
the fundamental insight of process theory and political markets. To 
recognize this fact and integrate it into an approach to judicial review in 
democratic process cases is not to capitulate to a narrowly procedural 
form of judicial review. Like the approach proposed by Hasen to con-
tested equality rights in the U.S., process theory can inform the second 
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stage of section 1 analysis. The Court may, indeed in many cases it 
should, defer to Parliament’s assessment of democratic values in the 
first stage of section 1 analysis before critically assessing the chosen 
means of achieving those objectives. Recognizing Parliament’s role in 
determining democratic norms does not lessen the danger posed by self-
interested status quo preserving legislation. 
The Court has shown a decided preference to turn a blind eye to the 
self-interested motives of provincial legislatures and Parliament in dem-
ocratic process cases. Even in Figueroa where the impugned provisions 
were designed to hamper the electoral fortunes of small political parties, 
the bona fides of Parliament was not questioned. The reason for the 
Court’s reticence may be a lack of evidence, good manners, or naïveté. 
Despite the Court’s curious inattention to Parliament’s conflict of inter-
est, Iacobucci J.’s reasons in Figueroa provide a powerful tool to com-
bat self-serving legislation enacted in the name of democratic values. 
Justice Iacobucci held that “legislation that exacerbates a pre-existing 
disparity in the capacity of the various political parties to communicate 
their positions to the general public is inconsistent with  
s. 3.”144 This rule, if it may be called that, is consistent with the basic 
premise of process theory; namely, that legislation should not impinge 
upon participatory rights in a way that helps to keep the Ins in and the 
Outs out. Justice Iacobucci’s interpretation of section 3 in Figueroa is 
relevant to the approach to judicial review in democratic process cases 
proposed in this paper because it demonstrates that on some level at 
least, the values that infuse process theory are consistent with the 
Court’s conception of democracy.  
(b)  Harper v. Canada: Deference Run Amok? 
Harper is notably more deferential than other recent Supreme Court 
decisions concerning the democratic process. One reason that can be 
offered for the deference in Harper, though not identified by the Court, 
is that third party spending limits do not affect competition between 
candidates and political parties. Indeed, one of the premises of third 
party spending limits is that they protect the competitive balance be-
tween electoral participants. As a result, there is a legitimate question as 
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to whether third party spending limits merit as careful scrutiny as more 
direct and obvious incumbent protection measures.
145
 The critical ap-
proach to the proportionality aspects of section 1 analysis outlined in the 
previous sections of this paper is intended to combat self-interested 
legislation in the electoral realm. Limits on third party spending, how-
ever, are not as obviously self-serving as gerrymandering or even other 
political finance controls. Limits on third party spending serve a legiti-
mate end; namely, supporting an egalitarian political finance regime. At 
the same time, however, third party spending limits may also shield 
candidates and political parties from criticism. Whether or not Parlia-
ment was acting in a self-interested fashion when implementing third 
party spending limits, strict scrutiny is warranted because electoral laws 
are uniquely vulnerable to abuse and legislative motive can never be 
truly ascertained. As Hasen suggests, scepticism is “a substitute for a 
probe of legislative ‘motive’” in the electoral realm.146 
Scepticism is decidedly absent from the majority decision in Har-
per. Justice Bastarache held that the rules that apply to elections reflect 
“a political choice, the details of which are better left to Parliament.”147 
He offers no reason why the Court should defer to Parliament’s “politi-
cal choice” regarding the details of the electoral process other than Par-
liament’s “right to choose Canada’s electoral model.”148 Although not 
stated, this idea harkens back to the majority judgment in Figueroa 
where Iacobucci J. stated that “the Charter is entirely neutral as to the 
type of electoral system in which the right to vote or to run for office is 
to be exercised.”149 Justice Iacobucci went on to explain in response to 
criticism from the Figueroa minority that in finding that promotion of 
majority governments was not a pressing and substantial objective he 
did “not mean to suggest that Parliament must choose an electoral sys-
tem that the Court believes will result in “good” or “better” governance. 
The Charter aside, the choice among electoral processes is, as LeBel J. 
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states, a political one — and not one in which the Court should involve 
itself.”150 The context in which Iacobucci J.’s remarks were made in 
Figueroa suggests that he was concerned about the implication that his 
reasons had for the first-past-the-post system, not laws governing the 
democratic process generally.
151
 Justice Bastarache in Harper, however, 
seems to understand laws governing the democratic process to be, if not 
beyond judicial review, certainly worthy of great deference. 
The question to be answered by the Court in future democratic pro-
cess cases is whether there is some principled basis for the extreme 
deference in Harper. If the Court’s deferential stance is an aberration, as 
I suspect that it is, then the Court is still left with the problem of articu-
lating a reasoned approach to democratic process cases that will provide 
a measure of consistency from case to case. The approach to judicial 
review in democratic process cases outlined in this paper is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s recent democratic process cases other than 
Harper and offers a coherent explanation for both deference to Parlia-
ment’s assessment of democratic norms and critical evaluation of Par-
liament’s means chosen to implement its democratic vision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Dialogue is the most fashionable account of the relationship be-
tween the Court and Parliament. The idea of a never ending conversa-
tion, however unsatisfying, is probably an accurate description of the 
interplay of the Court and Parliament over time. Dialogue, however, is a 
descriptive theory of judicial review, not a prescriptive one. The fact 
that the Court and Parliament engage in a dialogue does not provide any 
guidance as to which institution’s views should prevail in any given 
circumstance. This paper has not attempted to supplant dialogue as the 
means of understanding judicial review in the context of challenges to 
laws governing the democratic process. Instead, this paper has  
attempted to articulate an approach to democratic process cases that 
gives structure to the dialogue between the Court and Parliament. 
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To begin with, the Court should in most instances defer to Parlia-
ment’s assessment of democratic values. As a democratic institution, 
Parliament is better placed than the Court to ascertain the norms that 
should inform the democratic process. Both Libman and Harper follow 
this prescription and endorse the egalitarian model of election regulation 
in concept. The Court, however, must be cautious to confine its defer-
ence to the electoral realm. Deference to the choice of political philoso-
phy that informs election regulation does not extend to the regulation of 
activity outside the electoral domain. The Court in Harper failed to 
cabin its deference and was uncritical of Parliament’s regulation of pure 
issue advocacy. Finally, the Court must recognize that the regulation of 
the democratic process is vulnerable to abuse. The Court is uniquely 
suited, and Parliament is particularly ill equipped, to police self-
interested behaviour on the part of Parliament. The best way for the 
Court to fulfill its role in this regard is to critically assess the means 
chosen by Parliament to effect its objective in the section 1 proportion-
ality analysis. 
Dialogue is also an apt description of the relationship between the 
Court and the legal academy. The Court is dependent in some respects 
on the constructive criticism that it receives from the legal academy. 
The Canadian legal academy has engaged the Court in dialogue on 
many important subjects; however, comparatively little has been said 
about the law of the democratic process. Harper is a decision that raises 
important questions about the nature of political speech, the political 
philosophy that informs the regulation of the democratic process, and 
the relationship between the Court and Parliament. There is much to be 
said about all of these subjects. Moreover, the problems with the Harper 
decision indicate that the Supreme Court could benefit from some dia-
logue. As two critics of the infamous Bush v. Gore case wrote, “the 
academy must do its part to hold the Court accountable through rea-
soned criticism.”152 
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